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Abstract
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in implicit bias. Driving this concern is the
thesis, apparently established by tests such as the IAT, that people who hold egalitarian
explicit attitudes and beliefs are often influenced by implicit mental processes that
operate independently from, and are largely insensitive to, their explicit attitudes. We
argue that implicit bias testing in social and empirical psychology does not, andwithout
a fundamental shift in focus could not, establish this startling thesis. We suggest that
implicit bias research has been conducted in light of inadequate theories of racism and
sexism. As a result, such testing has not sufficiently controlled for subjects’ prejudiced
explicit beliefs and emotions, andhas not ruled out the possibility that explicit prejudice
best explains test subjects’ discriminatory associations and behavior.
Keywords Implicit bias · Racism · Sexism ·Moral Psychology · Responsibility
1 Introduction
The concept of implicit bias has generated intense interest among philosophers and the
public. Yet the empirical research upon which this enthusiasm is founded has recently
come under scrutiny. Critics have worried that implicit bias tests do not reliably predict
subjects’ performance of prejudiced actions better than explicit bias tests; they have





1 Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical College, 47 New Scotland Avenue MC 158,
Albany, NY 12208, USA
2 Department of Philosophy, Rice University, 6100 Main St., Houston, TX 77005, USA
123
Synthese
that academic and political focus on implicit explanations for prejudice draws attention
and resources away from efforts to understand and mitigate structural racism.1
In this paper, we raise a different kind of criticism, one that researchers and philoso-
phers studying implicit bias must confront even if they can meet these formidable
challenges. We will argue that the empirical research has not demonstrated, and with-
out radical changes could not demonstrate, that the rapid associative behaviors it
measures are anything more than straightforward expressions of subjects’ explicit
attitudes.
Fascination with implicit bias is predicated on the basic claim, offered by psychol-
ogists and accepted by philosophers, that the rapid associations and behavior that tests
such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) measure are not merely expressions of
subjects’ explicit attitudes. We will call this fundamental assumption, which drives
the need to posit some other set of exotic attitudes to explain the data, the Implicit
Explanation. The Implicit Explanation implies conclusions that are both surprising and
morally significant, and that further fuel public and philosophical interest in implicit
bias. Perhaps the most striking and troubling of these is the claim that even egalitar-
ian people, who hold egalitarian explicit attitudes and beliefs, are often influenced by
implicit mental processes that operate independently from, and are largely insensitive
to, their explicit attitudes. Depending on how one interprets this conclusion, one may
deduce from the empirical research that, disturbingly, nomatter our moral convictions,
the sub-personal processes of cognition that help us navigate the world will lead us to
perform sexist and racist actions.2
The promise that empirical psychologists, armedwith a new set of tools, would now
be able tomeasure the operation of these sub-personal processes and ground this body
of research in empirical fact has been another source of enthusiasm.Wewill argue here,
however, that the data from the most prominent existing tests for implicit bias do not
support the Implicit Explanation. Our argument will rely on the intuitive idea that some
rapid mental associations, and the behaviors that such associations cause, express and
reflect our explicit attitudes. For example, a teenager’s immediate and reflexive lunge
for a slice of pizza might express his love of pizza; a father’s instantaneous grimace
of pain when he sees his child skin her knee reflects his concern for her; a classical
pianist’s tendency to associate the concept [MUZAK] with [BAD] is an expression
of her belief that Muzak is a grating abomination. These agents are open books: their
rapid associations and behaviors tell us something about their explicit attitudes. If
the rapid associations and behavior measured by existing implicit bias tests were also
straightforward expressions of agents’ explicit attitudes in this way, then the Implicit
Explanation would be false. In this paper, we argue that implicit bias research has not
undermined this banal Explicit Explanation of implicit bias test results.
To demonstrate that empirical research has failed to establish the Implicit Explana-
tion, we will begin by showing that researchers have conducted implicit bias testing
1 For example, see Oswald et al. (2013),Machery (2017, 2021), andHaslanger (2015) for representatives of
each criticism, respectively. Prominent examples in popular press include Singal (2017) and Bartlett (2017).
Brownstein, Madva and Gawronski (2020) respond to various criticisms within empirical psychology, the
popular press, and philosophy. They respond to an online discussion of ours, but we believe that they
misconstrue our argument. We will clarify our argument here.
2 See for example, Jennifer Saul (2012), and Louise Antony’s (2016) response.
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in light of inadequate theories of, and therefore without adequate controls for, explicit
prejudice. As a result, their data may merely reflect subjects’ explicit prejudice that
extant tests simply fail to measure. Next, we will offer suggestions for how researchers
might improve their tests to attempt to address the criticisms we raise, while highlight-
ing the underappreciated difficulties of interpreting the data that even the best possible
empirical testing would yield. Finally, we will expand upon the philosophical signifi-
cance of our criticism.Wewill show that in their eagerness to chart its philosophical and
ethical implications, philosophers have not been sufficiently skeptical of the Implicit
Explanation. As a result, they have encouraged a larger social shift in our understand-
ing of how to relate to prejudiced agents that has serious moral costs. We conclude
with the positive suggestion that philosophers interested in implicit bias shift their
focus toward developing and defending views of explicit prejudice that could serve as
the basis of successful controls in implicit attitude testing.
2 Measuring implicit bias
Before making the case that implicit bias research has failed to vindicate the Implicit
Explanation, we note two caveats that will frame our discussion:
1. Most of the current work within social and empirical psychology, as well as much
of the philosophical literature on implicit bias, relies on data obtained from several
dominant experiments conducted and described in frequently cited papers. Most
prominent is the “Implicit Association Test” (IAT), developed by Greenwald et al.
(1998). Other dominant tests include the “Go/No-GoAssociation Task” (“GNAT”;
described in Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the “Sorting Paired Features Task” (“SPF”;
described in Bar-Anan et al., 2009), the “Brief Implicit Association Test” (BIAT;
described in Sriram et al. 2009), the “Affect Misattribution Procedure” (“AMP”;
described in Payne, 2009), and the “Affective Lexical Priming Score” (“ALPS”;
described in Lebrecht et al., 2009). We also focus our discussion on these tests.
2. We use the term “implicit bias” to refer to bias that is at odds with a subject’s
explicit attitudes.3 In pressing our criticism of implicit bias research, we treat
“explicit attitudes” as attitudes that subjects could verbally report if prompted to do
so. Common theoretical interpretations of “implicit attitudes” tend to assume that
because subjects cannot verbally report their presence, or assess their influence on
behavior, such attitudes must be “unconscious,” “uncontrollable,” or “arational.”
3 One might classify “implicit attitudes” in various ways, but these terminological differences will not
affect our basic argument. One might, for example, hold that implicit attitudes are just those attitudes that
subjects exhibit in implicit attitude testing. On that understanding of “implicit,” our argument could be
reformulated as follows: Empirical research on implicit bias has not shown that implicit biases, in this
sense, are not straightforward expressions of subjects’ explicit biases. Similarly, if one held that implicit
attitudes are just those attitudes that must be measured by implicit attitude tests and could not, in principle,
be verbally reported, then our argument could be restated as follows: Empirical research on implicit bias
has not demonstrated the existence of biased implicit attitudes because it has failed to provide evidence
that the attitudes subjects express in implicit bias testing could not, in principle, be verbally reported. In
any case, our fundamental thesis is the same: Empirical research on implicit bias has not demonstrated that
subjects’ rapid associations and behavior are not straightforward expressions of their explicit attitudes.
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To demonstrate the truth of the Implicit Explanation, one would need to provide
good evidence that subjects’ explicit attitudes did not underlie and explain their rapid
associations and behavior. The most straightforward way to do so would be to show
that even test subjects who harbored no explicit prejudice still exhibited biases in their
rapid associations and actions. Indeed, this is what standard interpretations of implicit
attitude testing claim that such testing does.4 Once a test established that a subject did
not harbor explicit biases, one could safely conclude that her biased associations and
actions in test conditions were best explained by implicit mental processes. But, as we
will now argue, the dominant implicit bias tests fail to demonstrate such a disparity and
therefore fail to demonstrate the existence of implicit bias. The reason is straightfor-
ward: such testing has been conducted with inadequate measures of subjects’ explicit
prejudices.
The most common measures of explicit prejudice the dominant tests employ are
the “Feeling Thermometer” and the “preference” survey. The first involves subjects’
self-reports of “temperature” on a numerical scale. For example, when filling out a
Feeling Thermometer for implicit racial prejudice, participants are asked, “Howwarm
or cold do you feel toward Black people?” and “How warm or cold do you feel toward
White people?” On preference tests for implicit racial bias, participants are asked
which of a set of statements best describes them: “I strongly/moderately/slightly prefer
White people (or White Americans) to Black people (or African Americans)” or, “I
strongly/moderately/slightly prefer Black people to White people,” or “I like White
and Black people equally.”5
The preference and Feeling Thermometer surveys are the standard and dominant
explicit attitude tests typically cited by both empirical psychologists and philosophers
who write about implicit bias. In fact, preference and temperature surveys are the
only means the canonical versions of the SPF (Bar-Anan et al., 2009, p. 333) and the
GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001, p. 651) use to measure explicit prejudice.6 Moreover,
it is worth emphasizing that many studies draw exclusively on data obtained from
the IAT as administered by the Project Implicit “virtual laboratory” (Rachlinski et al.,
2009; Beaman et al., 2009, Sabin et al., 2009, for example). More than 20 million
people have taken the IAT via the Project Implicit “Virtual Laboratory,” where racial
implicit attitude tests have no controls for explicit prejudice beyond standard Feeling
Thermometer and preference measures.7
These extant tests of “explicit prejudice” are insufficient to detect, and so to control
for, explicitly prejudiced attitudes. This is because a person may sincerely feel and
report “warmth” toward members of the group he is prejudiced against. Consider, for
4 See, for example, (Greenwald et al., 1998, p. 1475).
5 These questions are taken directly from the IAT as administered by the Project Implicit website, but they
are also included in the academic studies that describe the explicit measures used. See, for example, (Sabin
et al., 2009).
6 Some measures of implicit bias, such as the ALPS (Lebrecht, 2009), were not constructed using any
explicit measures at all, presumably on the assumption that implicit attitudes can be measured directly and
without controlling for explicit attitudes.
7 In their 1998 paper introducing the IAT, Greenwald et al. employed a more sophisticated measure of
explicit bias that we will discuss in the next section. This control was abandoned in many future uses of




example, a form of prejudice that involves holding explicit beliefs about a person’s
proper place in a social or natural hierarchy. Imagine, for example, a man who explic-
itly believes that women are goddesses who should be put on a pedestal, who should be
pampered at home, but who lack the natural aptitude necessary to hold public office.
Such a man could coherently, and sincerely, report feeling the same “temperature”
toward both men and women, or even that he “feels warmer” toward women. Or imag-
ine a person who explicitly believes stereotypes about white intellectual superiority
and black physicality, who coherently and sincerely reports having no “preference
for,” or feeling any difference in “warmth” toward, members of one racial group over
the other.
To see just how poor these measures of explicit prejudice are, consider Jones, who
explicitly believes that each race has its place in the world, with whites occupying the
top rung. While Jones believes that non-whites are by nature inferior, he also holds
that God loves people of all races. Jones is aware of the content of his beliefs, how
he came to have these beliefs (e.g. he knows he developed them during childhood),
and which of his actions result from these beliefs (e.g. he knows that he is harsher
and sterner with young Black boys than with young white boys because the former
“needmore discipline” to “learn their place”).We can imagine, too, that Jones’s beliefs
about the races play some role in shaping the patterns of emotions and desires that he
feels. Moreover, we can imagine that Jones fills out the thermometer and preference
questionnaires slowly and deliberately, and that he reasons to certain conclusions
using basic rules of logical inference, exhibiting characteristics which indicate that
his actions are the result of his explicit attitudes. When Jones is asked how warmly
he feels about whites and Blacks, he reasons, “White Man was made in God’s image;
Black Man was made by God as a lesser being whom White men are spiritually and
morally obligated to help. Ultimately, we are all God’s creatures. 10/10 for both.” We
can imagine, too, that Jones’s beliefs about the races play some role in shaping the
patterns of emotions and desires that he feels.
Let us assume that Jones forms prejudiced conceptual associations that involve the
concepts [BLACK] and [WHITE]. Because these prejudiced conceptual associations
are totally consistent with his explicit attitudes, it would be surprising if Jones’s rapid
associations, and whatever actions they cause, were anything more than expressions
of his explicitly racist beliefs. But given the inadequacy of the dominant tests’ controls
for explicit prejudice, Jones would be classified as a subject who holds “egalitarian
beliefs” but holds “implicitly” prejudiced attitudes toward Blacks—a clearly absurd
conclusion.
It should go without saying that one’s explicit racism need not be as obvious as
Jones’s for the point to hold. Subjects whose prejudices are subtler than Jones’s, but
nevertheless still explicit, will easily evade the standard controls as well. To infer the




3 Meeting the theoretical challenge?
To develop a test that could serve as a control for subjects’ explicit biases, one would
need to know what kinds of explicit attitudes could potentially underlie and explain
subjects’ biased associations and behaviors. This involves commitment to theoretical
claims about what explicit prejudice consists in. Use of the Feeling Thermometer, for
example, implies that feelings of relative “coldness,” and no other explicit attitudes,
could explain biased rapid associations and behavior in test conditions.We have argued
that the Feeling Thermometer is too crude to rule out the Explicit Explanation of such
behavior, but it is not obvious what an adequate supplement to that rudimentary model
of prejudice might be. In this section, we will present several conceptual and practical
difficulties researchers would have to overcome to construct and use an acceptable
alternative. We do not claim that building a satisfactory model would be impossible,
but, as we will show, the current research is not close to meeting the challenges we
will outline.
One difficulty is that a successful theory of prejudice must vary depending on
the form of prejudice one is controlling for and the characteristic operations of that
prejudice in the local context one is studying. Explicit racism toward Blacks in the
southern United States, for example, may characteristically consist in a set of beliefs
that differs from the beliefs held by explicitly prejudiced subjects in northern states.
And for any general form of prejudice (racism, sexism), there will be competing
conceptions of what that form of prejudice consists in. Is racist prejudice, for example,
fundamentally a matter of holding different attitudes toward different racial groups (as
the Feeling Thermometer seems to assume), a matter of holding attitudes that evince
acceptance or endorsement of racial domination, or something else altogether? Does
sexist prejudice consist in holding different attitudes toward men and women, holding
attitudes that implicate one in patterns of objectification or sex-based domination, or
in something else altogether?
Moreover, and to state the obvious, the mechanisms and psychological manifes-
tations of racist and sexist prejudice in each context are complex and evolving. For
example: Would recording the negative stereotypes participants held about members
of a marginalized group be sufficient to supplement the Feeling Thermometer, or
would one have to ask about “positive” stereotypes about members of that group as
well?8 A good answer would draw on a theory of prejudice and its operations, and
one could press similar questions about other attitudes and beliefs. Should researchers
ask subjects about their positive beliefs about members of the dominant group? Their
political ideals? Their appreciation of historical injustices? Their hopes and fears?
Their senses of humor? Answering these questions, and determining the extent to
which rapid associations and behaviors may be straightforward expressions of explic-
itly prejudiced attitudes, requires an intellectually serious theory of sexist and racist
moral psychology and a plausible conception of the functioning of sexism and racism
in the society under scrutiny.
8 Of course, this assumes that one knows which stereotypes to ask about. Such knowledge would require
a good theory of prejudice and insight into the sociopolitical dynamics of the local context.
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Though they are rarely used to control for explicit attitudes in implicit bias research,
there are psychological tests that reflect more theoretically sophisticated views of
racism and sexism and thus seem to acknowledge some of these difficulties.9 These
include JohnMcConahay’s (1981) Modern Racism Scale, the Symbolic Racism Scale
(Henry & Sears, 2002), the Diversity Scale (Wittenbrick et al. 1997), and the Discrim-
ination Scale (Payne et al., 2009). Similarly, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick
& Fiske, 1996) clearly reflects a conception of sexism that goes beyond “temperature”
and preference.
To be clear, this is not to say that these measures of explicit bias are “better” in the
sense that they more accurately predict discriminatory behavior than temperature or
preference scales. Rather, they are conceptual improvements.10 These more complex
measures of explicit racism and sexism would make for better explicit bias controls
because they strive to identify andmeasure ways in which a subject could harbor forms
of explicit prejudice that would evade cruder surveys but that could still underlie and
explain the subject’s rapid associations and behavior. For example, the Ambivalent
Sexism Inventory presumes, rightly, in our view, that sexism is not merely a matter
of “temperature” and preference, but, rather, that it can be constituted by more com-
plex attitudes, many of which could be “positive,” “warm,” or, as the developers of
the test write, “benevolent” (“A good woman should be set on a pedestal”; “Women
have a quality of purity few men possess”). In selecting from among possible con-
trols, researchers are, in effect, taking a position on the question of which explicit
attitudes could underlie and explain subjects’ rapid associations. Again, this implies
a commitment to a substantive theory of racism or sexism.
To be fair, some implicit bias researchers have used the more theoretically sophisti-
cated measures we mentioned above.11 But we will argue that even implicit bias tests
that do employ these more robust controls fail to vindicate the Implicit Explanation.
To fully evaluate whether even the best existing tests are reliable indicators of
explicit prejudice, one would first need to successfully present a justifiable and plau-
sible theory of explicit prejudice. Then, one would need to show that some set of
existing tests could, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, identify those respondents
with views marking them as explicitly prejudiced according to the theory. Implicit
bias researchers have not done this.
9 We include the full content of these measures in the “Appendix”. Where full content was unavailable,
we’ve included the “Representative Items” offered by the original authors.
10 Brownstein et al. (2020), responding to a blog post based on an unpublished version of this manuscript,
characterize our skepticism as grounded in the worry that implicit measures are “poor predictors” of prej-
udiced behavior, and that explicit measures may serve as better predictors. This is a misunderstanding
of our point. We are not arguing that implicit bias tests fail to predict behavior. Rather, our point is that
empirical research has not shown that the behavior implicit bias tests measure, predict, or explain is at odds
with subjects’ explicit attitudes. Our argument does not rest on a doubt that tests such as the IAT measure
subjects’ current rapid associations, or that, as Brownstein et al. put it, implicit measures such as the IAT
“reflect what is going on in a person’s mind in a given moment, which is shaped by complex interactions of
person-related and situation-related factors (296).” Again, what we doubt is that what is measured by the
IAT is best understood as discrepant with a subject’s explicit attitudes. The IAT may indeed reflect what is
going on in a person’s mind at a given moment, but what is going on in her mind at that moment may be an
operation of her explicit prejudice.
11 See Greenwald et al. (1998) and Payne et al. (2009).
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Even if implicit bias researchers did show that the most sophisticated existing
surveys (or some combination of them) reflected the best theories of the biases they
were studying, theywould still have to overcome serious difficulties of interpretation in
order to use them to control for explicit bias. Crucially, they would have to attend to the
distinction between measuring explicit prejudice and controlling for it on an implicit
bias test. Controlling for explicit prejudice requires ruling out the Explicit Explanation
for implicit bias test results, not determining “how racist” or “how sexist” respondents
are. All of the most sophisticated tests aim to measure subjects’ degrees of prejudice,
but the Implicit Explanation is a claim about the foundations of certain associative
and behavioral patterns. This means that while one might be justified in concluding,
on the basis of a low overall score on the Modern Racism Scale, for example, that a
subject harbored only a small degree of explicit racial bias, one would not be justified
in concluding that the handful of prejudiced explicit attitudes the subject did harbor
did not best explain his biased associations and behavior in test conditions.
The way psychologists tend to analyze the data they obtain from these tests vir-
tually guarantees that they will not be able to rule out the Explicit Explanation. For
example, in Greenwald et al. (1998), researchers scored subjects’ responses to ques-
tions about their racial attitudes on a scale of 1 to 5, with lower scores indicating less
explicit prejudice. Thus, even a person receiving a very “low” overall score might,
for example, strongly agree that “Blacks should not push themselves where they are
not wanted.”12 If such a person then registered biased rapid associations, would his
answers to the explicit bias control rule out the Explicit Explanation? We think not.
Despite his low overall score, it is plausible that this single prejudiced explicit attitude
could best explain his rapid associative patterns. Or suppose a subject who took the
Discrimination Scale (Payne et al., 2009) reported that he did not associate Black peo-
ple with any of the listed stereotypes except the stereotype that they are violent, or the
stereotype that they are not “intelligent at school.” Endorsing one or two stereotypes
of this kind would not prevent him from registering a low overall score on the scale,
but it could easily explain a host of biased associative patterns and actions.
Consideration of this issue raises a more general question of interpretation: What
do subjects’ answers to these more sophisticated questions mean? What is the ethical
significance, for example, of someone “agreeing somewhat” or “disagreeing slightly”
with statements such as “Once a man commits [to a woman], she puts him on a tight
leash,” (Glick & Fiske, 1996) or reporting that he has “felt sympathy for Blacks about
half the time?” (Payne et al., 2009) What does it say about a person if he believes
that “There is a real danger that too much emphasis on cultural diversity will tear the
United States apart” (Wittenbreck et al., 1997), that “Black leaders have been moving
at about the right speed” (Henry& Sears, 2002), or that “Women have a superior moral
sensibility” (Glick & Fiske, 1996)?
In highlighting these possible questionnaire responses, we do not mean to suggest
that the questions they answer are the wrong kinds of questions to ask. On the contrary,
they may yield just the kind of data one would need to assess a person’s explicit racist
or sexist attitudes. But the very complexity and nuance that distinguishes tests that
ask such questions from their simpler counterparts make them difficult to analyze. A
12 From “The Modern Racism Scale”; this question is a sample from Greenwald (1998).
123
Synthese
successful interpretation of a respondent’s answers to these loaded questions would
require an excellent understanding not only of how prejudice functions in the context
one is studying, but also of how the subject’s responses relate to his own psychology
and background. Someone like Jones, for example, might feel sympathy for Black
people all the time. He sees them as lowly and pitiable, after all. To score this response
as evidence of anti-racism, or egalitarianism, when it is in fact just the opposite, would
be a mistake. And a participant who agreed that women tended to keep men on “tight
leashes” might be offering a report of her life experience, endorsing a misogynistic
stereotype, or both. All of the most sophisticated tests for explicit racist and sexist
prejudice are subject to these worries.
At this point, one might ask whether, in the absence of effective controls for explicit
prejudice, and in light of these interpretive difficulties, there is other evidence in favor
of the Implicit Explanation, or if there are alternative measures researchers could
use to avoid some of the challenges we’ve highlighted here. For example, it may
seem significant that, anecdotally, many people who take implicit association tests
are surprised by their results, and one may wonder if such surprise is itself evidence
for the Implicit Explanation. A genuine egalitarian, after all, would have reason to be
taken aback upon learning that he formed prejudiced conceptual associations under
test conditions.
Researchers have not attempted to use surprise as a control for explicit attitudes,
but we might still ask whether such an approach could yield data that supported the
Implicit Explanation.13 We doubt, however, that such a strategy would succeed, given
that there are many reasons why one might be surprised by implicit bias test results
that do not imply a discrepancy between explicit attitudes and rapid associations. We
will offer just two here.
1. Subjects who “fail” implicit bias tests such as the IAT do so because they fail to
perform a task the tests instruct them to perform, such as quickly sorting pho-
tographs into categories. Those who are surprised at their results may simply be
surprised at their failure to complete the tasks successfully, which is compatible
with being surprised that they were unable to prevent their explicit attitudes from
influencing their rapid associative behavior. We might see such surprise outside of
test conditions, as well. A person might be surprised, for example, that he could
not suppress tears of joy at his child’s wedding, even though he tried very hard to
keep his composure. But his surprise would not be evidence that his tears were
anything but an expression of his explicit love and happiness.
2. A person may possess an inadequate conception of what “egalitarianism” requires
and believe, wrongly, that he holds egalitarian explicit attitudes when, in fact, he
does not. This misconception could explain a test subject’s sense of surprise at his
results without appealing to amismatch between his rapid associations and explicit
attitudes. Imagine a man who believes that women have the right to work outside
the home and to control their own bodies, but that as a matter of “scientific fact,”
men make for better leaders. Such a man might be surprised by his propensity to
associate [WOMAN] and [HOME] on an implicit attitude test, but this test result
is not at odds with his explicit attitudes.
13 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this suggestion.
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We are not claiming that these are in fact the best explanations of subjects’ surprise
at their test results. Rather, these alternate explanations aim to undermine the inference
from surprise to the Implicit Explanation.Measures of surprise cannot take the place of
robust controls for prejudiced explicit attitudes that reflect sophisticated conceptions
of explicit prejudice and its operation in particular contexts.
To be clear: our position is not that it is in principle impossible to effectively control
for explicit bias.14 Talented researchersmay be able to overcome the obstacles we have
described. But we do believe that the challenges are formidable. Meeting them, and
vindicating the Implicit Explanation, would require conceptual insight and ingenious
test construction that the current empirical research has not achieved.
4 Implications and clarifications
We will now discuss the implications of this failure, both for philosophy and for soci-
ety at large. The two are, of course, related, and it is easy to see why implicit bias
research has excited both theorists and laypersons. Implicit bias scholarship purports
to use empirical methods to demonstrate a surprising moral-psychological claim with
enormous ethical and social implications: Even good people with good explicit atti-
tudes (“committed egalitarians”) are subject to rapid associations and behavior that
cause them to behave in prejudiced ways. If true, this would indeed be a disturbing
conclusion—one that would call for us to rethink the ways in which we understand the
operations of prejudice and our own psychology.We have argued that this claim,which
has driven both academic scholarship and public discourse, has not been established.
At this point, one might protest that at least some of the recent criticism of implicit
bias research, including the critique that we are raising here, is misplaced. One might
suggest that we are reacting to a misrepresentation of the significance of implicit bias
research by media members unfamiliar with the underlying science, by opportunistic
public figures, or by institutions eager to employ “implicit bias training” in lieu of
addressing deeper issues.Wedonot deny that suchfigures have sometimes exaggerated
and misinterpreted the significance of the empirical research. But our criticism does
not target the embellishments and “hype” in public discourse that psychologists and
14 Thus, though we are sympathetic with Eduoard Machery’s (2017) suggestion that implicit bias research
has attempted to construct theories “on quicksand,” we nonetheless think that our particular criticism
may be addressable with the right kind of philosophical intervention. Machery (2016) argues that the
distinction between “implicit” and “explicit” attitudes is meaningless, because bias should be understood as
a character trait. It thusmakes no sense to draw a distinction between implicit and explicit bias. It is consistent
with our argument, however, that it maymake sense to think of prejudice as a trait that could, in principle, be
partly constituted by either explicit or implicit attitudes. And this leaves open the possibility that empirical
research may be attempting to show the surprising and morally significant thesis that people who have
egalitarian explicit attitudes may nonetheless possess prejudiced implicit attitudes. Thus, unlike Machery
(2016), we are not arguing that empirical psychologists have been attempting to demonstrate a thesis that
relies on a conceptual confusion. Rather, we are attempting to show that they have not demonstrated the
truth of that thesis. Our thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this clarification. For a recent presentation of




others familiar the empirical literature would reject.15 Rather, we are casting doubt on
the basic claim that the biases the empirical tests reveal are implicit.
In doing so, we are also responding to the widespread uncritical acceptance of the
Implicit Explanation among philosophers. Philosophical articles on implicit bias tend
to remind their audiences of the significance of the topic by echoing the core claim of
the empirical research, that it has provided uswith good evidence of the Implicit Expla-
nation, before going on to theorize about what could explain the discrepancy between
explicit and implicit attitudes, or about themoral significance of this discrepancy. Here
are some prominent examples:
1. “Research on implicit bias demonstrates that individuals can act in discriminatory
ways even in the absence of explicitly prejudiced motivations” (Brownstein and
Madva, 2018, p. 1).
2. “Evidence has been building that implicit attitudes are at least moderately good
at predicting real-world behavior, independent of the effects of people’s explicit
(verbally reported) attitudes” (Carruthers, 2018, p. 1).
3. “What explains the apparent disparity between self-reported attitudes and
behaviour?… While self-presentation effects undoubtedly play a role, it is very
likely that what psychologists call implicit attitudes explain some of the disparity
between reported attitudes and behaviour” (Levy, 2017, p. 535).
4. “There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious
beliefs, values, and attitudes, have implicit bias. ‘Implicit bias’ is a term of art
referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside of conscious
awareness or control” (Brownstein & Saul, 2016, pp. 1–2).
If our argument is sound, then even thisbasic framing of the topic,which beginswith
and relies on the conclusion that implicit bias tests have demonstrated a discrepancy
between rapid associations and explicit attitudes, is misleading.
Once accepted, the Implicit Explanation gives rise to at least three kinds of philo-
sophical questions that philosophers have been eager to take up. The first set of
questions is metaphysical: What are these implicit biases that help to shape our behav-
ior? Are they best understood as emotions, beliefs, “aliefs,” “behavioral clusters,” or
something else altogether? And given what they are, are they unconscious, arational,
or uncontrollable? One’s answers to these metaphysical inquiries lead to the second
and third topics, which are both ethical: First, are we morally responsible, and there-
fore potentially blameworthy, for our biased rapid associations and behavior? Second,
how should we go about altering our pernicious associative patterns, given our moral
and political hopes of living in a more just society?We will consider these three areas,
metaphysics, responsibility, and intervention, in turn.
Metaphysics: Credulous acceptance of the Implicit Explanation by the public and
philosophers has beenmutually reinforcing and has helped shape public thought about
human psychology and the operations of individual prejudice. More specifically, it has
15 As an example of the “hyping” of implicit bias research, Brownstein et al. (2020) offer Nicholas Kristof’s
claim that, “It’s sobering to discover that whatever you believe intellectually, you are biased about race,
gender, age, or disability.” They suggest that this conclusion is not informed by the actual science, which
suggests that “explicit beliefs about social concepts are, in fact, strongmoderators of implicit attitudes about
those concepts” (Brownstein et al., 2020, p. 298, fn. 15).
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helped establish and strengthen a conception of human psychology and prejudice that
understands rapid associative behavior as a mental phenomenon divorced from, and
potentially unresponsive to, the explicit attitudes that one might hope would form
the basis of our self-understandings and our everyday interactions with other people.
This conception depends on a particular kind of metaphysical interpretation of what
underlies and explains rapid associative behavior, one that understands it as the product
of a cognitive architecture that operates automatically, arationally, or outside of our
conscious control.16
Moral responsibility: This understanding of the relationship between rapid associa-
tive behavior and human psychology has ethical implications. Notably, it is relevant
to inquiry about our moral responsibility for rapid associative behavior and its con-
sequences. Insofar as one’s metaphysical interpretation of rapid associative behavior
distinguishes it from attitudes and beliefs that we rationally endorse or control, one
may be moved to take up what P.F. Strawson called the “objective,” rather than “par-
ticipant,”17 stance toward “implicitly” biased agents (including oneself), emphasizing
treatment andmanagement as opposed to reasoning, conversation, empathetic engage-
ment, and the feeling and expression of “reactive attitudes.”
We realize that this characterization of the pressure to move away from the inter-
personal ideals of the participant stance is abstract. There are, of course, competing
views of responsibility for “implicit” bias in the philosophical literature, each of which
has its own subtleties. To mention a few representative examples: Natalia Washington
and Daniel Kelly (2016) argue that individual moral responsibility for implicit bias
turns on whether or not knowledge of the empirical science surrounding implicit bias
is available in that person’s community. If not, then the person should not be held fully
accountable and blameworthy for his behavior. Maureen Sie and Nicole van Voorst
Vader-Bours (2016) urge a re-orientation from individual responsibility toward collec-
tive responsibility for implicit bias. And Robin Zheng (2016) argues that we may hold
“implicitly” biased agents accountable for their behavior in some sense (for example,
by demanding that they compensate victims, make efforts to change their behavior in
the future, or make amends), but that blaming them “would be like blaming a person
for a behavior that they acquired as the result of some trauma, which gets triggered
under certain circumstances; while such a disposition is something to be managed
by her and others, it is not something for which she deserves blame or deep moral
criticism” (79).18
Our aim here is not to evaluate the comparative merits of these metaphysical and
ethical positions. Rather, we are focusing on what they share in common to make
two general points. First, that one’s metaphysical interpretation of rapid associative
16 For example, consider interpretations such as Madva and Brownstein’s (2018) proposal that implicit
attitudes are clusters of semantic-affective associations that can be trained to change over time, but tend to
be unresponsive to the semantic content of our other mental states, Gendler’s proposal that, like phobias,
implicit attitudes are explained by “aliefs” (Gendler, 2008, 2011), Levy’s proposal that they are “patchy
endorsements” that resist rational correction, and the view that they are the result of “system 1” processes
on a dual system theory of mind (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
17 Strawson (1962).
18 As Zheng then elaborates in a footnote, “Here, with respect to this particular trait, we adopt the Straw-
sonian ‘objective’ attitude, the attitude we take towards non-human animals, young children, and beings
that are not fully moral agents” (79, fn. 30).
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behavior can make a concrete difference to our everyday interactions and relation-
ships. Second, that acceptance of the Implicit Explanation, combined with standard
views about moral responsibility, tends to encourage at least some shift away from the
participant stance and its standard modes of interaction.
If the empirical research provided strong evidence for the Implicit Explanation,
then one would need to carefully consider the merits of these views of responsibility
for rapid associative behavior. If, on the other hand, the Explicit Explanation turned
out to be correct (or largely correct), then we could reject all of them, and therefore
avoid the serious moral and social costs of a shift toward the objective stance. If the
Explicit Explanation is true, then to tell victims that transgressors’ behavior cannot be
attributed to them, or that they are not proper targets of “deep” criticism and blame,
would not only be misleading; it would deprive victims of the opportunity to confront
and engage with offenders in a way that fully reflects their shared humanity. And to
claim that offenders’ prejudiced associations are merely regrettable products of their
cognitive architecture and their surroundings, rather than expressions of their rational
agency, would not only be a distortion but an insult to the transgressors themselves.
Intervention: A similar point applies to efforts to alter prejudiced behavior. Accep-
tance of the Implicit Explanationmay lead one to suspect that rational changes to rapid
associative behavior are difficult or even impossible. And indeed, some recent work
on implicit bias in empirical psychology has focused on how to mitigate or intervene
on implicit bias using non-rational methods that rely on re-conditioning agents’ asso-
ciations or encouraging subjects to exercise more control over their actions in order
to align them with their egalitarian beliefs.19
But while one might be able to “recondition” one’s association of dark skin with
the concept [DANGEROUS], this change would have nothing to do with one’s under-
standing, perception, or outlook toward people with dark skin. Similarly, it would be
one thing to eliminate the stereotype that women are bad at math through retraining
evaluative-semantic associations between the phrase “Womenare good at” and “math.”
It would be another thing to eliminate one’s belief that women are naturally bad at
math by coming to a realization that women can be good at math, and to experience
confidence in their mathematical abilities as a result.
To be clear, our concern is not primarily prudential but ethical, motivated by a
moral commitment that is deeply embedded within the broadly liberal outlook that
inspires standard objections to sexism and racism in the first place. The point is not
that “rational” interventions would be more effective than non-rational interventions.
Rather, our concern is that these non-rational methods, when aimed at agents whose
rapid associations do in fact reflect their explicit attitudes, are inconsistentwith respect.
They merely manipulate a person’s behavior, rather than encourage rational changes
in how he views and responds to others.
19 For example, Kawakami et al., (2005, 2007) have tested the effects of “counterstereotype training,”
which involves having subjects respond “Yes” to images of Black people or women, or having subjects nod
(Wennekers, 2012) or pull a joystick toward themselves when prompted with Black or Arab-Muslim faces
and push it away from themselves in response toWhite faces. Forbes and Schmader (2010) tested the effects
of training subjects to associate the phrase “women are good at” with math terms, as well as interventions
that aim to reduce the influence of one’s implicit biases on one’s actions without intervening on one’s
psychology (Beauclac and Kenyon, 2014). For a defense of using these forms of de-biasing techniques
outside the laboratory, see Madva (2017).
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If the Implicit Explanation does turn out to be true, and re-conditioning is needed,
this would be a disturbing fact, and one we should not take lightly. The conclusion
that such means are necessary should be understood not as an opportunity to toast the
dawning of an exciting new era of science-based approaches to moral improvement,
but rather as a sobering concession that we cannot confront a new, pernicious form
of racism and sexism without abandoning our traditional understanding of persons
as responsible agents who could come to understand one another as moral equals.
This should be seen for the pessimistic conclusion it is, regardless of the cheery pro-
gressive attitude that can sometimes accompany it. Our argument, that psychologists
and philosophers in this debate have not shown that the biases in question are indeed
implicit, gives us reason to eschew, or at least delay, such pessimism.
5 Conclusion
It is important that philosophers, especiallymoral psychologists, engagewith empirical
observation, and not only because their work should be informed by real life, and what
real human beings are like. Philosophical reflection and conceptual refinement allow
us to better interpret experimental data. In the case of implicit bias, philosophers have
been eager to interpret empirical results, but they have largely focused their attention
on answering the three kinds of questions we outlined above. In the process, they
have produced a vast body of technical literature in a short period of time, offering
critical and competing views of what implicit attitudes are and the implications that
follow from thesemetaphysical conclusions.We have not compared the relativemerits
of these positions because our contention is that the philosophical drive to interpret
needed to express itself at an earlier stage.20
Thus, though we are critical of the extant work on implicit bias, our thesis is
not entirely negative. We believe that our understanding of the current research’s
conceptual shortcomings suggests a way in which both empirical psychologists and
philosophers working on implicit bias might productively change course. Psycholo-
gists should devote attention toward finding better ways to measure (and not solely
predict) explicit prejudice, rather than focusing primarily on refining their methods
of tracking implicit associations and behavior. In doing so, they should bear in mind
the points we raised in section III, where we discussed the difficulties of developing
adequate controls for explicit prejudice and stressed that doing so would require both a
sophisticated theory of the way that prejudice operates in the context under study and a
sense of the agent’s psychology and history. Developing effective controls for explicit
prejudice will involve drawing on normative moral-psychological theories—theories
20 Even philosophers who argue for metaphysical conceptions of implicit prejudice that challenge common
conceptions of implicit bias assume that the empirical research has at least demonstrated a discrepancy
between subjects’ implicit and explicit attitudes. Consider, for example, Carruthers’ (2018) proposal that
the same mental structures can underlie and explain both “explicit” prejudice (what a subject would report
about herself when prompted) and “implicit” associations and behavior. Carruthers may be right that we
need not develop a special ontology to explain implicit bias test results. But even he grants that the empirical
research has shown a discrepancy between what subjects would be willing to report if asked and their rapid
associations. It is this basic assumption that we are critical of. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
encouraging us to distinguish our argument from Carruthers’.
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that help us identify morally good and bad states of mind. Ethicists and normative
moral psychologists must be seated at the table alongside the empirical psychologists
and philosophers of mind who take on the challenge.21,22
Appendix
Where the full content was not made available by authors, we include the “Represen-
tative Items” listed.
Glick, Peter andSusanT. Fiske. “TheAmbivalent Sexism Inventory:Differentiating
Hostile and Benevolent Sexism.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(3),
(1996).
21 To be clear, we do not think that moral philosophers should simply ignore the findings of empirical
psychologists, either. For an elaboration on the relationship between normative moral psychology and
empirical psychology, see Wolf (2007).
22 We are grateful for feedback we received from SusanWolf, DouglasMacLean, RamNeta, Robert Smith-
son, Charles Siewart, Calvin Lai, Elizabeth Reis, Matthew Dennis, Pamela Reis, Chris Hakkenberg, and
the anonymous referees who reviewed the manuscript. We have also benefited from discussion with audi-
ences at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress and at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association,
where Elís Miller Larson commented on the paper. We would also like to thank Brad Cokelet and David
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McConohay, John, Betty B. Hardee and Valerie Batts, “Has Racism Declined in
America? It Depends on Who is Asking and What is Asked,” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 25(4), 1981.
The “Modern Racism” Scale:
Payne, B. (2009). “Attitude Misattribution: Implications for Attitude Measurement
and the Implicit-Explicit Relationship.” In A. Black andW. Prokasy (Eds.) R. Petty, R.
Fazio, and P. Brinol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new wave of implicit measures.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sample 1 (ANES Panel Study)
Feelings: Do you feel warm, cold, or neither warm nor cold toward blacks? [Response
options: Warm, cold, neither warm nor cold].
If warm: Do you feel a little warm, moderately warm, or extremely warm toward
blacks?
If cold: Do you feel a little cold, moderately cold, or extremely cold toward
blacks?
Sympathy: How often have you felt sympathy for blacks? [Always, most of the
time, about half the time, once in a while, or never].
Admiration: How often have you felt admiration for blacks? [Always, most of the
time, about half the time, once in a while, or never].
Influence: Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American politics,
just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence
in American politics? [Response options: Too much influence, Just about the right
amount of influence, Too little influence].
Sample 2 (ANES Time Series)
Feelings: Do you feel warm, cold, or neither warm nor cold toward blacks? [Response
options: Warm, cold, neither warm not cold].




If cold: Do you feel a little cold, moderately cold, or extremely cold toward
blacks?
Sympathy: How often have you felt sympathy for blacks? [Always, most of the
time, about half the time, once in a while, or never].
Admiration: How often have you felt admiration for blacks? [Always, most of the
time, about half the time, once in a while, or never].
Stereotypes:
Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale? [ 1 = Hardworking; 7 = Lazy].
Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale? [ 1= Intelligent; 7=Unintelligent].
Symbolic Racism:
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up, blacks should do the same without special favors” [Disagree, Somewhat
disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Strongly agree].
2. Generations of slavery have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks
to work their way out of the lower class” [Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither
agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Strongly agree].
3. It’s really amatter of some people just not trying hard enough; if blacks would only
try harder they could be just as well of as whites. [Disagree, Somewhat disagree,
Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Strongly agree].
4. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” [Disagree,
Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Strongly agree]
Sample 3 (Associated Press/Yahoo! News/Stanford University study)
Liking: “How much do you like or dislike each of the following groups? Whites …
Blacks…” [Response options: dislike a great deal, dislike a moderate amount, dislike
a little, Neither like nor dislike, like a little amount, like a moderate amount, like a
great deal].
Admiration: “How often have you felt admiration for blacks?” [Extremely often,
Very often, Moderately often, Rarely, Never].
Sympathy: “How often have you felt sympathy for blacks?” [Extremely often, Very
often, Moderately often, Rarely, Never].
Stereotypes:Respondents were asked “Howwell does each of these words describe
most blacks?” andwere shown a list of 14 adjectives (Friendly, Determined to succeed,
Law abiding, Hard-working, Intelligent at school, Smart at everyday things, Good
neighbors,Dependable, Keep up their property, Violent, Boastful, Complaining, Lazy,




Wittenbreck B., CM Judd, and B Park. “Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit
level and its relationship with questionnaire measures.” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology. 72(2):1997.
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